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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 301 
Accident time: 10:50 Accident Date: 11/08/2000 




Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 14/08/2000 
ID original source: JM Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:Z08
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
Accident report 
The following official “accident summary” was made available in January 2001. No other 
report was made. The summary was compiled by the demining group’s site manager. For 
obscure reasons, the country manager of the programme edited the content of the following 
before making it available. 
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The following text has been further edited when necessary to conceal the identity of 
individuals and organisations involved. 
At 10:50 on 11 Aug 2000, [the victim – name withheld by group manager] detonated a mine 
whilst conducting clearance in the Cordon Sanitaire Minefield at UTM 0380797 8194039 in 
Mukumbura Communal lands. 
At the time of the accident the Operations Manager and Project Doctor were located at the 
Crew 1 site. 
I was made aware of the accident when Crew Supervisor reported via HF radio. I suspended 
operations at the other sites. Further information revealed that the deminer had stood on a 
mine but, curiously, was not seriously injured. The casualty was treated on site and stabilised 
by the crew paramedics. He had sustained a sprained left ankle and a small laceration on his 
right shin, 2cm above the ankle. 
 
On Site Examination 
An on site examination was conducted at 12:55hrs. 
The area in which the accident occurred was Box 540 which had been prepared by [the 
ground processing machine] Mine Collector to a depth of 35 cms. [The victim] had cleared the 
A Row of mines, which were R2M2, and had commenced clearance from the A Row to the B 
Row. Marking was clearly visible within his box. 
Full equipment was being used by the deminer. The detector was placed to the rear of his 
base stick and, on inspection, was found to have been set correctly. 
The visor was located in the cleared area approximately 2m forward of the crater. The Team 
Leader reported deminer was wearing it at the time of detonation. Full PPE was worn by the 
deminer. 
The trowel was located beside the detector. 
The blast crater was located within the cleared area, within the A Row of mines. The crater 
was conical in shape. It was approximately 35cm deep and 65-67cm wide. This would 
indicate the mine was very deep. 
 
Observations 
The deminer was clearing from the A Row towards the B Row. All mines within the A Row 
had been disposed of. He had just brought his clearance equipment  from the B Row to 
commence another 1m wide lane when, as he was placing his equipment at the 
commencement point of the new lane, a mine detonated. 
The crater was within the cleared area, just within his last 1m wide lane from A to B Rows. 
The and Crew Paramedic who was with an ambulance at the CP, was immediately available 
to attend to the casualty. 
All marking within the deminer’s box was clearly visible and well laid out. 
 
Conclusions 
From the nature of the accident the following conclusions were made: 
a) The size of the crater shows the mine to be very deep. Detectors are only capable of 
detecting R2M2 mines effectively to a depth of 13cm. That the deminer was not seriously 
injured supports the conclusion that the mine was deeply buried. 
b) The deminer had conducted his clearance drills over the area effectively, but due to the 
depth of this particular mine, was not in a position to identify a signal. The accident was 
therefore unavoidable. 
c) Immediate treatment and CASEVAC from the minefield of the casualty was adequate. 
d) Communications proved adequate during the CASEVAC. 
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e) Suspension of operations within the other crews was well co-ordinated and controlled. 
Signed: Operations Manager 
[The mine is not definitely identified in the above text. Identification is by inference from the 
other mines and the difficulty of detecting the R2M2.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 381 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 





See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief (undated) field medical report was obtained from another source. The following 
reproduces its content verbatim [asterisks denote unrecognised letters]:  
Blood group: 0+ 
Details of injuries: Foot sprain, Cell***itis and small laceration right shin 
Field management: pressure bandaging, no haematoba 
Bufen 400g *** 
Benzyl penicillin *********** 
Post operative management: Referral to orthopaedic specialist. 
Addendum: Patient fully recovered  
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the internal 
investigators recognised that the detector in use could not find the mine at the depth they 
believed it to be. It was a management failing that they continued to sanction the use of 
detection equipment that could not find the mines they were looking for. 
The investigators determined that the mine was “very deep” from examining the crater. They 
did not have soil-hardness testers so could not accurately calculate the depth of the mine 
from its crater. Further, if the mine had been close to the 35cm depth of the crater, it is 
unlikely that it would be detonated by surface pressure unless the ground were very soft. No 
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mention is made of the ground conditions in the report but the date of the accident falls within 
the dry season in the area when ground hardness is more of a problem than ground softness. 
As a result of the above, it is possible that the mine was missed at a detectable depth, and so 
that the field supervision and performance of the deminers clearing the area was inadequate. 
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was edited prior to being 
made available.  
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